This paper explores what happened when the state of Utah moved away from its traditional defined benefit pension. Instead, it offered new hires a choice between a conventional defined contribution plan, versus a hybrid plan option having both a guaranteed benefit component and a defined contribution plan shifting investment risk to employees. We show that some 60 percent of new hires failed to make any active choice and, as a result, they were automatically defaulted into the hybrid plan. Slightly more than half of those who made an active choice elected the hybrid plan. Interestingly, post-reform, employees who failed to actively elect a primary retirement plan were also far less likely to enroll in a supplemental retirement plan, compared to new hires who made an active plan choice. We also find that employees hired following the reforms were more likely to leave public employment, resulting in higher turnover rates than previously. This could reflect a reduction in the desirability of public employment under the new pension design. Our results imply that public pension reformers must consider employee responses, in addition to potential cost savings, when developing and enacting major pension plan changes.
additional financial strain on taxpayers, the Utah legislature responded by making major changes to pension offerings provided to new employees. 2 The legislator sponsoring the reform, Dan Liljenquist, explained that, "our goals with reform were two-fold: one, to make sure that we could meet every penny of the commitment that we had already made to current employees and retirees, and two, to reduce and eventually eliminate the pension-related bankruptcy risk to the state." (McGuinn 2015, P 9) . 3 Legislation authorizing the pension reform went into effect in 2011, officially closing the defined benefit (DB) plans to new employees and establishing the new two-option retirement plan that would replace it. The two new retirement plan options were expected to be less generous than the former DB plans and could, therefore, be anticipated to reduce the state's future pension liabilities. Post-reform, new hires could choose one of two new options: a defined contribution (DC) plan, or a hybrid pension plan that incorporated both DB and DC elements (about which we say more below). New hires who failed to make an active choice between plans were automatically enrolled in the hybrid plan.
Using administrative data provided by URS, we examine how new hires' plan choices differed according to individual and job characteristics. Additionally, we evaluate how the pension reform changed two employee behaviors: contributions to supplemental plans, and turnover patterns. Prior literature has not examined these behavioral responses to such public pension changes, focusing mainly on how funding responded to changes in contributions and benefits. 4 By contrast, our analysis provides evidence from Utah suggesting that it is important 2 Due to legal constraints, benefits could not be reduced for existing employees. 3 A simulation analysis by Evans and Phillips (2014) estimated that the pre-reform Utah retirement system had a 50 percent chance of exhausting its pension fund by 2028. 4 Plan sponsors generally are aware of the balancing act between two competing goals of providing adequate retirement income to members and ensuring the long-term financial stability of the plan. In the 2013 Summary Report not to neglect the effects of retirement plan restructuring on public employee behavior. Indeed, such outcomes could undermine state governments' ability to deliver services promised to their citizens.
We summarize our findings in Figure 1 . First, most new hires failed to make an active choice between the available pension plan options, so defaults mattered. Second, one might have anticipated that the less generous retirement plan would have encouraged new hires to save more through supplemental plans, but this did not occur. Interestingly, those who did make an active plan choice for the primary account were also likely to participate in supplemental retirement plans. Third, post-reform, public employee turnover rates rose.
Figure 1 here
In what follows, we begin by reviewing key aspects of Utah's traditional DB plan and compare it to the two new plans adopted in 2011. Using administrative records provided by URS,
we then estimate models of plan choice to evaluate who elected which plan and who defaulted.
Inasmuch as both of the new plans are likely to pay less generous retirement benefits than the prior DB pension, we also inquire whether new hires saved more voluntarily, so as to bolster retirement incomes. We also compare turnover rates for both pre-and post-reform new hires, to assess the impact of retirement plan type on employee retention rates. In a final section, we draw lessons from the Utah reform relevant to other states and municipalities looking to restructure their pension offerings.
to Members, Daniel Andersen, the executive director of URS wrote: "while conditions for retirement benefits have changed over the past few years, our primary purpose was to provide retirement security and professional service to members and retirees." (see http://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/SummaryReport/2013/summaryReport.pdf.)
Relevant Prior Studies
While we lack the space to review what has grown to be a very large literature on pensions, we call attention here to a few recent accounts on how public pensions have sought to deal with pressing fiscal challenges. Media reports by Walsh (2011) , Lyman and Walsh (2014) , and Greenhouse (2011) , among others, have reported on how public pension benefit and contribution parameters were changed in the wake of the financial and economic crisis. In the academic literature, Chingos and West (2013) , Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) , and Milevsky, Promislow, and David (2004) have examined specific state pension changes and their impacts.
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More recently, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2015) have shown how linking public pension payouts to investment performance might help alleviate the critical funding shortfalls many states now face.
Particularly pertinent to the present paper is prior research on how pension reforms alter employee behavior. To date, however, most empirical studies have focused on private-sector firms and employees, as shown in two reviews by Gustman and Mitchell (1992) , and Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994) . Case studies of corporate plan conversions are discussed by Clark and Munzenmaier (2001) . In point of fact, relatively few private sector firms give employees the opportunity to choose among alternative types of pension plans. 6 For this reason, prior studies have mainly focused on worker turnover patterns, generating two main findings. First, employees of firms offering pension plans tend to separate less frequently than employees at other firms (Allen, Clark, and McDermed, 1993) . Whether this is causal or simply correlational has been difficult to confirm, due to a lack of identifying restrictions. Second, there appear to be no major differences in turnover rates between employees offered DB versus DC plans. This is contrary to what might be expected, since DB plans have traditionally been more "back-loaded," meaning that employees with long tenures typically receive more valuable retirement benefits than employees with shorter tenures. By contrast, hybrid and DC plans provide benefits in a more balanced manner, rewarding employees with both long and short employment tenures more equitably. Moreover, retirement wealth accumulated in DC plans is more portable than that accumulated in a traditional DB plan, meaning that DC plans provide much greater value than DB plans for short-term workers who may wish to move to a new employer prior to retirement.
In the public sector, it is somewhat more common that participants are allowed a choice between two or more pension plans, especially at public universities. NASRA (2010) showed that nearly half of state universities offered faculty choice between a DB and a DC plan. Clark and Hanson (2011) reported that five statewide retirement systems covering general public employees or teachers offered a DB/DC choice, two offered a choice between a DB and a hybrid, and one offered a choice between all three plans types. According to Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli (2014) , states that started offering optional DC plans before the financial crisis did so because these gave workers the opportunity to manage their own money, particularly given the rising equity market.
Post-financial crisis, Utah has been the only statewide system to launch a new reform providing choice between two plan types; nevertheless, five other states have joined Utah in offering a hybrid plan.
In the last two decades, many researchers have studied the impact of public sector plan choices on aspects of employee behavior. For instance, Clark, Ghent, and McDermed (2006) studied public university faculty members' pension plan choices in North Carolina. 7 As expected, they found that older individuals were more likely to select the DB option, whereas younger and, potentially, more mobile workers were more likely to select the DC plan. In their study of Oregon's Public Employees Retirement System, Chalmers, Johnston, and Reuter (2008) evaluated how different plan types influenced the retirement patterns of older individuals, concluding that a substantial minority of employees did not adequately understand the plans' complex incentives. Goldhaber and Grout (2013) University system, using an administrative data set linked to a participant survey on plan and worker attributes. They concluded that those preferring the DC plan were predominately men; they also tended to be less risk averse and more financially literate than employees electing other plan options. Thus, while prior studies have provided insight into the types of workers electing different types of retirement plans when given a choice, they are not informative with regard to how workers electing different retirement plan types respond along behavioral or other dimensions. Accordingly, in what follows, we will investigate the determinants of plan choice by public sector employees in Utah, along with associations between plan choice and measures of two important behavioral outcomes: post-reform contributions to supplemental plans, and post-reform employment turnover rates. In this section, we describe the various retirement plans offered to public employees in Utah. First, we discuss the pre-reform defined benefit plan that covered full time employees prior to 2011. Next, we review the post-reform hybrid and defined contribution plans offered to new hires following these reforms and compare the generosity of the pre and post-reform pension plans.
Public Retirement Plans in Utah
Finally, we describe URS supplemental retirement savings plans available to employees both pre and post-reform.
The Traditional Defined Benefit Plan (Tier I) Employees hired prior to July 1, 2011 were automatically enrolled into URS Tier I System, a traditional DB plan. The Tier I Retirement The New Plan Options (Tier II). Employees hired after July 1, 2011, must choose between a DC plan and a hybrid plan; their election would need to be declared prior to the end of their first year of employment, and this choice is final and irrevocable. Employees failing to elect a plan prior to the end of their first year are automatically enrolled into the default, which is the hybrid plan.
URS communication materials provided to all new hires seek to present a balanced assessment of the two plan options, stating that "both plans have advantages and disadvantages.
The plan that's better for you will depend on your situation." The web page then outlines various
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The basic structure of this retirement plan is described in Tier 1 Noncontributory, https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/RetirementSystems/noncontrib.pdf aspects of each plan in detail and directs new employees to additional resources, including a "decision guide" and several online pension benefit estimate calculators.
An employee electing the DC plan receives an annual employer contribution of 10 percent of his annual earnings into the 401(k) account, 12 and these employer contributions vest after four years of eligible employment. Employees may also make additional contributions to their accounts on a voluntary basis. Distributions are allowed after retirement, termination of employment, or age 59 ½, and the funds may be withdrawn various ways, at the retiree's discretion. No cost of living adjustments are provided to DC participants.
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The hybrid plan differs from the old DB plan in several ways. First, the retirement benefit is determined by multiplying the employee's years of service by 1.5 percent, times the monthly average of his highest-five earnings years. Compared to the old DB plan, the longer earnings averaging period is likely to lower the benefit. Second, the hybrid plan also requires participants to work for 35 years to qualify for a normal retirement benefit at any age, five years longer than under the old DB plan; participants may also take an unreduced retirement benefit at age 65 with four years of service. Retirees can take a reduced benefit beginning at age 62 with 10 years of service, or age 60 with 20 years of service; early retirement reduces benefits by about seven percent per year between age 60-63, and approximately nine percent per year for age 64-65. Third, the hybrid plan permits up to a 2.5 percent cost of living benefit adjustment each year, depending on the change in the Consumer Price Index. Retirees have the option of receiving their maximum retirement benefits based on the formula, or they can select from several joint and survivorship 12 Similar to other state plans, the URS Public Safety and Firefighters' plans are somewhat more generous, with a state contribution of 12 percent of salary, compared to general state employee plans. 13 For an overview of cost of living increases in benefits in public pension plans, see NASRA (2014b).
options. Individuals may also make voluntary contributions into several retirement saving plans described below.
The hybrid also has another key feature differentiating it from the old model. Every year, the plan's Board of Trustees must set a certified contribution rate for the defined benefit portion of the hybrid plan based on the preceding year's actuarial valuation. As long as the employer certified rate remains below 10 percent of compensation, employees are not required to make any additional plan contributions. If the rate exceeds 10 percent, participants in the hybrid plan must contribute any amount in excess of 10 percent of pay. Conversely, if the employer's certified contribution rate to the DB component were to fall below 10 percent, the employer then must contribute the difference between 10 percent of compensation and the certified rate into the participant's 401(k) plan. For example, in 2014-15, the employer's certified contribution rate was 8.22 percent of payroll; therefore, the employer contributed 1.78 percent of payroll into employees' 401(k) accounts that year. 14 Pension and employer contributions to the 401(k) account are vested after four years of service.
Comparing the Tier I and Tier II Systems. Generally speaking, the new Tier II arrangement is anticipated to pay lower benefits, as compared to the old Tier I DB plan. We illustrate the expected difference in retirement benefits assuming the relevant benefit formulas and various age/service thresholds for an unreduced benefit. Depending on the plan type (DB versus hybrid) and years of service, the outcomes may be compared as follows:
Plan 
Multivariate Determinants of Public Plan Choice
New hires in the Tier II system must choose between enrolling in the hybrid plan or in the DC plan within one year after their initial employment. As noted above, employees who fail to make an active choice of primary plan option are automatically enrolled into the default hybrid plan.
17 For arguments against holding stock in DB plans, see for instance Bader and Gold (2007) and Black (1989) . 18 Participants in the Tier 1 Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System still receive an additional employer contribution of 1.5% of their compensation in the 401(k) plan. All other employers also have the option of contributing to URS 401(k) and/or 457 Plans on behalf of their employees. Retirement Plan, and the Judges' Retirement System, are excluded from our analysis. Table 1 reports the plan choices of individuals hired post-reform. Almost 60 percent of Utah's new hires failed to make an active choice between the two plan options and were therefore defaulted into the hybrid plan, consistent with findings from other states that have offered workers a choice of primary retirement plans. 21 One explanation for why so many people may have defaulted is suggested by the literature on behavioral inertia (Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2004; Yang 2005) . Another explanation might be that employees actually preferred the hybrid plan over the DC option. This suggests that workers actually preferred the hybrid plan, and simply avoided the transaction cost of making an active choice producing the same outcome as doing nothing. In Washington State, where public sector workers were given a choice between a 20 Appendix Table 2 provides details on the data construction and how specific variables are defined. 21 In states that offer their workers choice of DB or DC plans, Olleman (2009) traditional DB versus a hybrid plan, Olleman (2009) found that close to 70 percent of employees rejected the hybrid plan default, actively opting for the traditional DB plan. As the traditional DB plan was no longer an option in Utah, it seems likely that some URS participants defaulted to the hybrid plan because they favored it, while others' choice was likely to have been due to inertia.
Table 1 here
Of the approximately 40 percent of URS new hires who actively elected a retirement plan, slightly over half selected the hybrid plan, and slightly fewer (48 percent) chose the DC. We also see that over time, the proportion of individuals actively selecting the hybrid plan increased, and the ratio of people defaulting shrank somewhat. This contrasts with the case of Illinois, where Brown and Weisbenner (2014) reported that the proportion of individuals selecting the default grew over time.
To elucidate some of the demographic and other factors associated with workers' tendency to make an active choice of retirement plan options rather default into a plan, Table 2 Retirement System, and an additional 7% are members of the more generous Public Safety and Firefighters' System. Most new hires are women (62%), and the average salary earned in the second calendar year of employment (the "plan choice year") was around $32,000 in 2014 dollars.
The average entry age across all workers in our sample is 33.3, although individuals hired after the reform were slightly younger than those hired before the reform. Table 2 here
Termination rates during the second year of employment were around 13%. In the sample, the termination rates appear to be the same for the pre-reform and post-reform groups; however, the post-reform group includes almost a full year of new hires still in their second year on the job when the sample was drawn. Accordingly the termination rate for the post-reform group may be understated: if we remove these recent hires from the sample, we find that the post-reform termination rate is about 17%. Almost 35% of pre-reform new hires made voluntary contributions to one of the supplemental retirement plans offered by URS during the plan choice year, but only 18% of the post-reform sample contributed to these plans. Table 3 categorizes workers by individual and job characteristics, and it also shows the percentage of new hires in each subgroup who elected each plan option. A higher proportion of men made an active choice. Women were more likely to opt for the DC plan, among those making an active plan choice. Employees with higher initial salaries also were more likely to make an active choice; moreover, more highly-compensated employees who made an active choice tended to favor the DC plan. Employees working at educational institutions were more likely to default into the hybrid, and general government employees were more likely to make an active choice.
Educational employees who made an active choice were more likely to choose the DC plan, while general government employees who made an active choice were more likely to choose the hybrid plan. In summary, defaulters differed from the active choosers in a number of ways. On average, defaulters were two years younger, made $6,000 less per year, were much less likely to be employed in state government, and were more likely to be in public education.
Table 3 here
We explore these patterns further using multivariate regression analysis, with results appearing in Table 4 . Six linear probability models are presented, 22 with two specifications for each of three dependent variables: (i) enrolled in hybrid plan whether by default or active choice,
(ii) made an active choice, and (iii) chose the DC given that an active choice was made. The first specification for each dependent variable includes a vector of individual and job characteristics, while the second specification also controls on two actions taken after the plan choice: whether the new hire terminated employment, and whether the new hire contributed to a supplemental retirement savings plan.
Table 4 here
The first column presents results for models of whether new hires enrolled in the hybrid plan, either by default or by active choice. In a sense, this analysis assumes that defaulters elected inaction, knowing they would end up in their desired plan. State government employees (the reference category in the equation) were 5-8 percentage points less likely to participate in the hybrid than were local government, public education, or higher education employees. Members of the Public Safety & Firefighters' system were more likely to enroll in the hybrid, as were men and the lower-paid.
Column 3 of Table 4 reports on which newly hired employees made an active election of their retirement plan; the model posits that defaulters differ from participants who made an active choice. Results indicate that new hires age 45+ over were more likely, and those younger than 25 less likely, to make an active choice compared to those age 25-29. Men tended not to make an active selection, while state government employees were significantly more active compared to those in higher education, local government, or public education. Interestingly, in each succeeding year, new hires were increasingly likely to make an active election, perhaps reflecting growing knowledge about the two plans and their differences.
In Column 5 of Table 4 , we describe which persons making an active selection chose the DC plan. Among these employees, older persons were more likely to select the hybrid plan, perhaps because they expected to be less likely to change jobs in the future. Conditional on making an active choice, men chose the hybrid plan more often, while the higher paid elected the DC plan.
Higher education staffers were 9 percentage points less likely to elect the hybrid plan, perhaps indicating their greater anticipated career mobility. Over time, a larger percentage of new hires who made an active choice selected the hybrid plan.
Two additional variables are included in Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4 , in an effort to control for factors indicative of additional difficult-to-observe information about new hires. That is, we determined whether each participant subsequently contributed to a URS supplemental retirement plan, and whether each terminated his employment in the second year on the job.
Interestingly, participants who did save in the supplemental plans were also more likely to have made an active pension choice in their first year. In other words, these individuals appear to have been more attentive than average to retirement plan features. By contrast, workers leaving employment in their second year were less likely to have made an active plan choice, and when they did, they chose the DC plan more often. In other words, the defaulters are also more likely to anticipate that they will leave public employment.
Did the Reform Boost Supplemental Retirement Saving?
If new hires understand that the post-reform retirement plans are likely to be less generous than the old DB plan, they may make an effort to save more in the supplemental retirement plans to accumulate sufficient retirement resources. 23 To test for this, we have calculated participation patterns in supplemental retirement plan for pre-and post-reform new hires. These are based on employee contributions to URS supplemental plans and do not include employer contributions to the 401(k) plan associated with the hybrid or DC plan. for those making an active election were actually higher than pre-reform (33 verses about 25 percent) while those who defaulted into the hybrid plan were much less likely to save additional amounts (7 percent). Finally, those who elected the hybrid plan were somewhat more likely to enroll in one of the supplemental saving plans, compared to those choosing the DC. Figure 2 and Table 5 here 23 Indeed the NASRA (2014c) report states that "public employees will need to take advantage of supplemental savings vehicles to maintain similar salary replacement rates in retirement, pre and post reform" (p.14).
A multivariate linear probability analysis of the time pattern in Table 6 
How the Reform Affected Turnover Patterns
One concern sometimes expressed by employers who alter their retirement plans is whether such changes will influence turnover rates. 27 Because our dataset includes terminations reported prior to November 1, 2014, and there is a 30-60 day lag in employer reporting, we restrict our sample for this analysis to individuals hired prior to September 30, 2012. Additionally, we remove 43 individuals who terminated employment due to death or disability. 
Figure 3 here
Our tabulations in Table 7 indicate that more than 87% of those hired prior to the reform were still employed two years later, while fewer than 83% of those hired after the reform remained as of the two-year mark. It is also interesting that new hires not making an active choice of a pension plan post-reform had considerably higher turnover rates, as compared to new hires who elected either the DC or the hybrid plan. People who chose the DC plan had slightly higher turnover rates, compared to those in the hybrid plan. Table 7 here
In Table 8 , we report estimated coefficients of the probability of an employee remaining on the job after one year of employment. Three groups are of interest: post-reform hires, the full sample, and the sample of DB and hybrid participants alone. 28 Once again, it is clear that people who defaulted into the hybrid plan behave differently, compared to those making an active choice.
Employees who actively elected the hybrid plan were eight percentage points more likely to remain on the job compared to the defaulters, and new hires electing the DC plan were two percentage points more likely to remain on the job versus the defaulters. Moreover, turnover post-reform was about four percentage points higher than in pre-reform years, and the results are largely similar for the samples with or without DC participants. Older employees were less likely to leave public employment, as were men and those with higher annual salaries. Table 8 here
Conclusion and Discussion
State and local governmental pension managers across the United States confront important financial challenges due to low pension funding ratios and rapidly rising contributions required to maintain these plans. In response to this financial challenge, many public sector employers have modified their retirement plans to reduce both their current annual pension costs and future pension liabilities. A few states have implemented more systematic changes, freezing their traditional DB plans and instead, offering employees a choice of alternatives that shift investment risk away from employers and onto employees. Utah is a prime example of a state that has fundamentally altered its retirement plan for newly hired workers, by replacing its traditional DB plan with the choice of a hybrid plan or a DC. Our analysis contributes to the relatively limited literature by examining the impact of public retirement plan reform on Utah's public sector workforce.
Similar to other studies, we find that a majority (about 60 percent) of the URS new hires defaulted into the hybrid plan. Among those who did make an active choice, slightly more than half selected the hybrid plan, and the remainder chose the DC plan. Our analysis goes further in evaluating the impact of public pension reform by examining employee behavior post-reform.
Since the new plan options are anticipated to yield less generous benefits than the old DB plan, we evaluate whether new hires saved more, compared to pre-reform employees, and whether the new plan led to higher turnover rates. Our analysis of participation in supplemental saving plans spans the Great Recession, so it is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions. Nevertheless, we find that, post-reform, fewer new hires enrolled in supplemental retirement plans compared to pre-reform, so they did not respond to lower expected retirement incomes by increasing their retirement saving.
Interestingly, however, new hires who did make an active plan choice were also more likely to enroll in the supplemental plan than pre-reform new hires: 33 percent of individuals making an active choice enrolled in a supplemental plan during the post-reform period, compared to around 25 percent in the three years before the reform was enacted. By contrast, those defaulting into the hybrid plan had lower enrollment rates in supplemental plans. In other words, this analysis suggests that people who are defaulters in one dimension -failing to make a choice of their primary plan -also fail to make an active choice in other areas, like enrolling in a supplemental plan.
We also evaluated whether the less generous retirement system is associated with higher termination rates among new hires, and here we found that 4 percent more new hires left public employment in Utah post-reform, compared to beforehand. We must caveat this conclusion by noting that post-reform turnover could also reflect a recovering labor market compared to the years prior to the plan change. In other words, if job opportunities improved post reform, newly-hired public employees may have had other employment options to consider.
It is also likely that many workers' failure to make active retirement plan choices could spur plan administrators to provide financial education programs and opportunities to learn about the retirement benefits offered. This could enhance their old age provision, and might also reduce turnover among new hires. As yet we cannot determine how these reforms may influence public employees' retirement patterns, nor do we estimate cost savings to the state or taxpayers associated with the reform in this paper. But we do believe that defaults in pension reforms shape public workers' employment, saving, and turnover behaviors. Consequently, public sector pension managers and policymakers may wish to consider these effects when evaluating future pension reforms.
Yang, Tongxuan. (2005) Note: The table shows Benefit is not based on a fixed formula. We use the dataset in row 8 for all analysis except the analysis of retention rates (Tables 7 and 8) for which we use the data set in row 10.
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Variable Definitions
Entry Year: The fiscal year ending June 30 during which the individual was first hired into a eligible position by a Utah Retirement System covered employer Plan Choice Year: The first calendar year after the entry year in which the individual earned at least .0417 years of service credit. For individuals hired after July 1, 2011, this is the calendar year that includes the date when their plan choice became final, or the year immediately following that year, if they first hired near the end of the year. Entry age: Approximate age of employee when they first became a member of one of the plans administered by the Utah Retirement System. Salary in plan choice year: Employee earning in the plan choice year in 2014 dollars. If less than one year of service was reported, earnings are annualized by dividing total salary by total reported service. Employer: The classification of the employer where the individual worked most during the calendar year in which plan choice became final. State Government includes quasi-state agencies and independent agencies. System: The pension system in which the individual earned the most service credit during the calendar year in which plan choice became final. Terminated in second year: Indicator for an individual separating from employment within the first 24 months, based on terminations reported before November 1, 2014. Contributed to SRP in plan choice year: Indicator for an individual making a contribution of any amount to at least one of the four Supplemental Retirement Plans (SRPs) offered by URS. 
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